A Schelling Model with Adaptive Tolerance by Urselmans, Linda & Phelps, Steve
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
King’s Research Portal 
 
Document Version
Peer reviewed version
Link to publication record in King's Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Urselmans, L., & Phelps, S. G. (2018). A Schelling Model with Adaptive Tolerance. PloS one.
Citing this paper
Please note that where the full-text provided on King's Research Portal is the Author Accepted Manuscript or Post-Print version this may
differ from the final Published version. If citing, it is advised that you check and use the publisher's definitive version for pagination,
volume/issue, and date of publication details. And where the final published version is provided on the Research Portal, if citing you are
again advised to check the publisher's website for any subsequent corrections.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the Research Portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognize and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
•Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the Research Portal for the purpose of private study or research.
•You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
•You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the Research Portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact librarypure@kcl.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate your claim.
Download date: 28. Feb. 2018
A Schelling Model with Adaptive Tolerance
Linda Urselmans1*, Steve Phelps2,
1 University of Essex, UK
2 King’s College London, UK
* linda@lurselmans.me
Abstract
We introduce a Schelling model in which people are modelled as agents following simple
behavioural rules which dictate their tolerance to others, their corresponding preference
for particular locations, and in turn their movement through a geographic or social
space. Our innovation over previous work is to allow agents to adapt their tolerance to
others in response to their local environment, in line with contemporary theories from
social psychology. We show that adaptive tolerance leads to a polarization in tolerance
levels, with distinct modes at either extreme of the distribution. Moreover, agents
self-organize into communities of like-tolerance, just as they congregate with those of
same colour. Our results are robust not only to variations in free parameters, but also
experimental treatments in which migrants are dynamically introduced into the native
population. We argue that this model provides one possible parsimonious explanation of
the political landscape circa 2016.
1 Introduction 1
In this paper we model the adaptation of tolerance in reaction to migration flows into 2
an existing population by drawing on related work from social psychology and political 3
science. International migration is becoming an increasingly defining feature of Western 4
countries, and a key question is what the social implications of large-scale migration and 5
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increasing ethnic diversity are. As societies grow more diverse and immigration 6
increases as the world becomes increasingly globalised, concerns about immigration in 7
Europe are high [1]. 8
In social psychology, immigrants and citizens of host societies can be understood as 9
two different groups that lend identity to its members. To native-born people, 10
immigrants thus form an ‘outgroup’. Intergroup threat theory describes the perceptions 11
of threat that people perceive from an outgroup [2]. Perceived threats to society and 12
culture from immigrants are worrying large amounts of voters across Europe [1]. Threat 13
theory includes perceptive threats, which will be the focus in this paper. Thus, whether 14
or not the threat is real is not the primary concern: what matters is that people feel as 15
if it were real. Survey respondents frequently overestimate the number of immigrants in 16
their country [3]. Actual numbers of migrants do not predict perceived threat [2, 4], but 17
perceived numbers do [4]. This can help explain why anti-immigration attitudes are 18
often high in areas with low migration: following the Brexit referendum in 2016, [5] 19
have examined the demographics of voters. They find a negative relationship between 20
EU migration and support for leaving the EU: “of the 20 places with the most EU 21
migrants 18 voted to remain. In many of the areas that were among the most receptive 22
to the Leave campaign there were hardly any EU migrants at all.” [5, p.10]. 23
Intergroup threat theory has proven an effective tool in testing what drives such 24
sentiments [6]. Perceived threats to key values in society can explain the anti-immigrant 25
hostility in Europe [7]. Those who believe that traditional values are undermined and 26
that societal cohesion is not ‘what it once was’, are also more likely to be sceptical of 27
immigration [7]. 28
Integrated threat theory has drawn elements from intergroup contact theory, initially 29
proposed by [8] in 1954 as the ‘Contact hypothesis’. Drawing on studies from mixed and 30
segregated neighbourhoods in the US, Allport concluded that under certain conditions, 31
white people with frequent contact with black people experienced decreased racial 32
prejudice. Intergroup contact theory is not a proposition of frictionless interactions of 33
out-groups resulting in increased trust or social cohesion. Positive contact can 34
potentially lead to these outcomes, but negative contact implies opposite effects [9]. 35
Physical proximity increases the likelihood of contact, but whether that contact is 36
positive (promoting understanding) or negative (invoking a threat perception) is not 37
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always clear [9]. In many empirical cases which often times feature migrants as an 38
out-group, the contact conditions are not positive [9]. Migrants that flee poverty and 39
seek work in a first-world country may have a very different collective set of common 40
goals than the host society that was born into what they perceive as the status quo. 41
Differing cultural norms between the host and migrant population can present a social 42
challenge to migration [10], and this would not constitute a positive contact situation. 43
Migrants might not speak the native language, presenting an obvious technical barrier 44
to surpass, strengthening the ‘otherness’ perception of out-groups [10]. 45
In the field of political science, contact theory has enjoyed increased attention since 46
Robert Putnam proposed that, contrary to the consensus at the time, diversity 47
decreases social cohesion in communities [11,12]. Putnam pointed out that while 48
immigration as a source of diversity has a positive effect on society in the long run, its 49
short-term effects can be largely negative. [10] echoes similar sentiments: in the long 50
run, immigrants contribute to society and integrate, but in the short run, positive 51
effects may be outweighed by social friction generated from the influx of diversity. 52
Thus, threat theory is the study of precedents of prejudice towards outgroups, and 53
contact theory is the study of the context in which different groups interact. 54
Both theories have been empirically tested in social psychology and political science, 55
resulting in hundreds of studies (for a meta-study of contact and threat theory, see [13], 56
for a meta-study on social capital and cohesion, see [14]). To date, the relationship 57
between diversity and social capital is unclear. The occurrence and strength of the 58
relationship is dependent on the context it is placed in. [13] find whether data is taken 59
from national or sub-national level, will effect the resolution of information of groups 60
and their behaviour and ultimately, the results of a study. Movement is easier to 61
capture with higher resolution data. Tangential to these findings, [15] notes the stark 62
differences in operationalisation of social capital variables (particularly that of trust) 63
that drive the differences in results between studies. 64
Empirical studies face difficulties in operationalising variables. Effects on the 65
individual level, such as decreased prejudice as a result of positive contact with an 66
out-group member, must not necessarily persist at the group level. [16] However, much 67
of the research that has spawned as a result of [12]’s finding that diversity invoking 68
threat perceptions has been on macro-level. This means that parts of the underlying 69
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theory cannot be captured. Threat theory emphasizes the threat-related antecedents of 70
prejudice such as loss of identity though the presence of an outgroup that challenges the 71
values on which the identity is founded. Contact theory by contrast focuses on the 72
context of the contact [2]. 73
We bridge this micro-macro gap by employing an agent-based model [17]. 74
Agent-based models are particularly suited to exploring theories of social complexity 75
since they are able to capture the properties of heterogeneous populations of individuals, 76
each of who act according to realistic behavioural rules and are located in a geographic 77
and/or social space [18]. Typically, agent-based modelling takes a bottom-up approach 78
in which the model is imbued with micro-level behaviours, which then give rise to 79
macro-level behaviours which can be observed empirically in the output from the model; 80
thus it is easier to bridge the micro-macro gap because all micro-level behaviour is 81
automatically accounted for. 82
This paper approaches inter-group tolerance from an agent-based perspective in 83
order to understand the implications of migration as an introduction of diversity into an 84
existing population. Previous research has employed agent-based models to introduce 85
differing levels of tolerance [19] and to explore the minority-majority relationships of 86
different groups [20]. In this paper we build on the formalization of the model proposed 87
by [19]. We analyse a model in which we introduce two crucial innovations. Firstly, our 88
model incorporates migration. Secondly, tolerance in our model is adaptive; agents can 89
alter their tolerance levels as they evaluate their surroundings. We use our model to 90
investigate segregation outcomes under environmental conditions where migrants 91
introduce new diversity into the existing population, and both groups have to adapt to 92
the changed social environment. The adaptation of the model proposed by [19] was 93
chosen so that model outcomes of non-adaptive and adaptive agents can be compared 94
more easily. 95
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section we describe 96
our methods and our model. In section 3 we present our results. Finally we conclude in 97
section 4. 98
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2 Method 99
We use agent-based modelling [17] to analyse the relationship between diversity and 100
social cohesion. Our model is based on the framework originally introduced by 101
Schelling [21]. Two differently-coloured populations of agents are situated in a 102
2-dimensional grid on which they can move around. The agents have a preference for 103
locations which are populated by agents of the own colour, and they move accordingly. 104
Preferences are quantified according to the threshold fraction of similarly-coloured 105
agents in the neighbourhood that is required for an agent to be satisfied with its 106
locale. [21] showed that even a small preference to be near agents of the same colour 107
gives rise to a large amount of segregation. 108
We use a similar framework, but introduce migration and adaptation of tolerance. 109
We denote one of the colours — green — as representing natives, and the other — blue 110
— as representing migrants. Migration is modelled by allowing the blue population to 111
grow as new migrants arrive at particular times, and at particular locations, around 112
which they cluster. Both groups of agents follow the same behavioural rules, which 113
comprise a movement rule, and a tolerance adaptation rule. The former is similar to 114
earlier Schelling models in which agents move over time relocating to their preferred 115
neighbourhoods. The latter is an innovation of our particular model; when agents are 116
exposed to the out-group their tolerance increases if they are currently satisfied with 117
their environment, but otherwise it decreases. The model thus deviates from the 118
original Schelling model to include additions that have contributed to recent literature 119
in Urban Studies [19]. 120
In the next section we describe our model in precise detail. The model is analysed by 121
simulating it very many times, recording and drawing free parameters randomly as 122
described in section 2.2. We analyse the model under five different immigration 123
treatments, which are described in section 2.3. We record the dependent-variables for 124
each simulation run, as described in section 2.4. In section 3 we present a cross-sectional 125
and time-series analysis of dependent and independent variables under each treatment. 126
Our analysis shows that there are very clear effects, which can be demonstrated by the 127
use of simple descriptive statistics and scatter-plots, and without the need to resort to 128
opaque statistical tests. The source-code used for simulations is freely available under 129
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an open-source license [22]. 130
2.1 The model 131
A set of agents At = {a1, . . . , an,t} are located on a toroidal lattice with a total of 132
N = 50× 50 vertices V at time t ∈ Z. The location of agent ai at time t is denoted 133
pi,t ∈ V . Each agent ai has a colour attribute denoted ci, which is either blue (ci = B), 134
or green (ci = G). Green agents are the hosts (‘natives’) and they are randomly placed 135
onto the lattice at the beginning of each simulation. Blue agents are migrants and arrive 136
at a later stage. Agents cannot die or otherwise exit the grid. Fig 1 shows a 137
visualisation of a typical state of the model. 138
Fig 1. An example state of the simulation showing the colour ci of each agent ai. Blue
squares are occupied by migrant agents and green squares by natives. White squares are
empty cells. Both populations eventually form visible clusters.
Agents have a preference to be near other agents of the same colour, but can see 139
only their local neighbourhood. Formally, let H(p) denote the 5× 5 Moore 140
neighbourhood of location p ∈ V , which consists of the set of all other vertices located 141
on the lattice within a Euclidean distance of two nodes from p (allowing for diagonal 142
movement). The neighbours of agent ai are denoted Nt(ai) which contains the set of 143
agents in the neighbourhood of pi — i.e. N(ai) = {aj : pj ∈ H(pi)}. 144
Each agent ai has a tolerance threshold fi,t ∈ [fmin, fmax] which determines the 145
fraction of out-group members the agent tolerates in their immediate neighbourhood. 146
The fraction of agents that are similar to agent ai is given by 147
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si,t =
|{aj ∈ Nt(ai) : ci = cj)}|
|Nt(ai)| . (1)
Agents are either satisfied or dissatisfied with their neighbours. They are satisfied if 148
and only if the fraction of nearby similar agents meets their tolerance threshold. The 149
utility of agent i at time t is denoted ui,t ∈ {0, 1} and is given by: 150
ui,t =
 1 : si,t ≥ fi,t0 : si,t < fi,t . (2)
Algorithm 1 Movement rule for agent ai
L← RandomlyChooseVacantSites(z) . choose |L| = z candidate locations
L?← {pi,t} . initialise candidate locations
for all l ∈ L do
g ← |{aj ∈ Nt(l) : ci = cj}| . number in-group agents in neighborhood
d← |{aj ∈ Nt(l) : ci 6= cj}| . number of out-group agents in neighborhood
s← g/(g + d)
if d > 0 ∧ s ≥ fi then
L?← L? ∪ {l} . update candidate locations
end if
end for
l?← ChooseOneAtRandom(L∗)
pi,t+1 = l? . update location
The set of dissatisfied agents is given by Dt = {ai ∈ At : ui,t = 0}. At every time 151
period each dissatisfied agent ai ∈ Dt, who is currently located at pi,t, randomly samples 152
a number, z, of unoccupied locations Li from the lattice. They then randomly choose a 153
new location from the subset of these for which the ratio of in-group to out-group 154
agents meets their tolerance threshold, i.e. {l ∈ Li ∪ pi,t : si,t ≥ fi,t}. If no satisfactory 155
alternative locations are found, then the agent remains at its current location pi,t. The 156
movement rule for an agent ai is summarised by the pseudo-code in Algorithm 1. 157
As in [23], with probability 10−2 per tick, agents that are satisfied will also relocate, 158
this time randomly picking a location from z randomly-chosen vacant locations, without 159
considering their utility. This models the fact that people in the real world will move 160
due to a variety of reasons, and not just due to diversity tolerances. If an agent fails to 161
find a new location, the agent’s tolerance will remain unchanged. If the agent is still 162
unhappy in the next time period, it will try and find a new location again. 163
A key feature of our model is that the tolerance of an agent adapts to its local 164
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Algorithm 2 Decision rule of agent ai.
if |{aj ∈ Nt(ai) : cj 6= ci}| > 0 then . at least one outgroup agent in neighbourhood?
if ui,t = 0 then . agent is dissatisfied?
Move agent . see Algorithm 1
fi,t+1 ← fi,t . tolerance remains the same
else
fi,t+1 ← min(fi,t + ∆f , fmax) . increase tolerance by ∆f
p← draw randomly from U(0, 1)
if p ≤ 0.01 then . satisfied agents move with probability 0.01
L← RandomlyChooseVacantSites(z)
pi,t+1 ← ChooseOneAtRandom(L)
end if
end if
else
fi,t+1 ← max(fi,t −∆f , fmin) . decrease tolerance by ∆f
end if
environment, and positive contact with out-group agents leads to an increase in 165
tolerance. Accordingly, at each time period every satisfied agent ai ∈ At : ui,y = 1 who 166
is exposed to at least one out-group agent in its environment increases its tolerance 167
threshold by a constant term ∆f , up to the maximum value fmax. Tolerance decreases 168
by the same amount if an agent is surrounded by agents of the same colour. In all other 169
cases, the tolerance remains the same: 170
fi,t+1 =

min(fi,t + ∆f , fmax) : ui,t = 1 ∧ |{aj ∈ Nt(ai) : cj 6= ci}| > 0
max(fi,t −∆f , fmin) : |{aj ∈ Nt(ai) : cj 6= ci}| = 0
fi,t : ui,t = 0 ∧ |{aj ∈ Nt(ai) : cj 6= ci}| > 0
. (3)
The changes in tolerance are thus tightly linked to states of happiness, and contact is 171
not frictionless. The inclusion of the happiness-condition emulates the fact that 172
integration is potentially a costly process. The costs themselves are not modelled, but 173
rather, the happiness condition acts as a proxy for willingness to pay these costs. A 174
happy person is more willing to engage than an unhappy person. Happiness, we recall, 175
is purely a representation of whether the neighbourhood is satisfactory. The entire 176
decision rule of the agents is summarised by the pseudo-code in Algorithm 2. 177
Depending on the experimental treatment (see section 2.3 below), the population of 178
agents can grow as new migrants arrive. The number of native agents is always constant, 179
but new migrants can arrive in discrete waves of migration. Migration will only occur 180
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during the first tmig = 1000 ticks. The population dynamics are specified in terms of: 181
1. the final population density — PopDen — which is a parameter that specifies the 182
fraction of occupied sites after all migration event have occurred (at t = tmig); 183
2. the native share of the population — NatShare — which specifies the ratio of 184
natives to migrants at the end of the simulation; and 185
3. the number of waves of migration — E — which specifies how many migration 186
events occur. 187
At the beginning of the simulation a total of NG native agents are placed randomly 188
onto the lattice, where 189
Nmax = round(PopDen×N) (4)
NG = round(NatShare×Nmax), (5)
and for the treatment where there is no dynamic immigration (E = 0) a total of NB 190
migrant agents are also placed randomly, where 191
NB = round((1−NatShare)×Nmax) (6)
On the other hand, in treatments where migration is dynamic (E > 0), there are no 192
migrant agents on the lattice at the beginning of the simulation. Rather, the first wave 193
of migration occurs at time 0.05× tmig, and the subsequent migration waves occur at 194
evenly spaced intervals of 0.9× tmig/E ticks. During each wave of migration an 195
additional number 196
∆B = round(NB/E) (7)
of migrant agents are simultaneously placed onto the lattice, clustering around a focal 197
vacant location pB with the highest number of migrants in its neighbourhood, breaking 198
ties randomly: 199
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pB = ChooseOneAtRandom( arg max
v∈V :|{ai∈At:pi=v}|=0
|{ai ∈ N(v) : ci = B}|) (8)
If there are no existing migrants on the grid, then instead we use the total number of 200
agents in each neighbourhood to rank candidate focal locations. The additional 201
migration sites for the new arrivals are chosen by iteratively finding the best neighbour 202
of the chosen focal location pB ; sites are ranked firstly according to the highest number 203
of surrounding new migrants, and secondly according to their local population density 204
within their neighbourhood. The placement algorithm is summarised in the pseudo-code 205
given by algorithms 3 and 4. A visualisation of this process can be found at [24]. 206
Algorithm 3 Choose locations for migrant agents during migration waves
function PlaceMigrants(pB , ∆B) . Place ∆B migrant agents around location pB
PB ← {pB} . Initialise the set of locations for immigration
while |PB | < ∆B do . More migrants to place?
pB ← BestNeighbour(pB , PB) . Find the best neighbouring location
PB ← PB ∪ pB . add it to the result set
end while
return PB
end function
Algorithm 4 Find the neighbouring site with the greatest population density
function BestNeighbour(pB , PB) . Best neighbour of pB excluding locations PB
if |N(pB)−PB −{ai : pi ∈ N(pB)}| > 0 then . Vacant sites not already chosen?
P∗ ← {} . Initialise best locations
d∗ ← −∞ . Initialise best density
for all p ∈ H(pB)− PB − {pi : ai ∈ At} do . All vacant unchosen neighbours
d← |{ai : pi ∈ H(p)}|/|H(p)| . Calculate local population density
if d > d∗ then
d∗ ← d
P∗ ← P∗ ∪ (p, d∗)
end if
end for
return ChooseOneAtRandom({p : (p, d) ∈ P∗ ∧ d = d∗})
else
p←ChooseOneAtRandom(H(pB))
return BestNeighbour(p, PB)
end if
end function
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2.2 Initial conditions 207
The majority of parameters governing the initial conditions of the model are randomly 208
varied between simulation runs in order to test the robustness of the model. We also 209
record these values so that they can be used as independent variables in order to 210
ascertain any effects. These are described in turn below, and summarised in table 1 (the 211
remaining constant parameters are summarised in table 3, and the state variables in 212
table 4). 213
Tolerance distribution 214
When agent ai arrives at the simulation its initial tolerance fi,0 is drawn i.i.d. from a 215
uniform distribution fi,0 ∼ U(fmin, fmax). After the initialization, the agent adapts 216
their tolerance according to Equation 3 as summarised in Algorithm 2. For all 217
simulations in this paper we set fmin = 0.05 and fmax = 0.95. These limits prevent 218
agents from fixing at the extreme values of tolerance; with these constraints agents will 219
always be able to tolerate one out-group member in their neighbourhood (without these 220
constraints, any agent reaching full tolerance or intolerance would never readjust again, 221
since just one out-group member would be above the tolerance threshold). 222
Rate of change of tolerance 223
The rate of change of tolerance ∆f is the increment used when agents adapt their 224
tolerance (see Equation 3). At the beginning of each simulation it is drawn randomly 225
∆f ∼ U(10−5, 10−3) and remains constant throughout the simulation. The low values of 226
∆f reflect the slow rate of change of attitudes of the population. 227
Final population density 228
The final population density PopDen determines the fraction of occupied sites after all 229
waves of immigration have occurred (|Atmig |/N). From thereon, the number of agents is 230
constant. At the beginning of each simulation this parameter is randomly drawn from a 231
uniform distribution ∼ U(0.75, 0.98). 232
Schelling models are typically assumed to run under conditions of high density [20], 233
which is why the minimum is still 34 of the map covered. Density also acts as a proxy for 234
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freedom of choice. Higher density results in less freedom of choosing better areas. 235
Final native share of the population 236
The final native share of the population NatShare determines the ratio of natives to 237
migrants after all waves of immigration have occurred. This parameter is initialised 238
randomly by drawing from a uniform ∼ U(0.02, 0.98) at the beginning of each 239
simulation. In treatments without migration (E = 0) it determines the fraction of 240
natives in the initial population, which thereafter remains fixed. In treatments with 241
migration (E > 0), it determines the number of migrants added in each wave (see 242
equations 5, 6 and 7), which in turn determines the final fraction of natives in the 243
population. 244
Considering the extremes of this parameter, when NatShare = 0.02, the world 245
would fill up with migrants until migrants constitute 98% of the population, and natives 246
constitute 2%. Whilst national-level migration does not lead to migrants outnumbering 247
natives, the reasoning is that on smaller geographical areas, this majority-minority 248
flipping can indeed occur. Because segregation is mediated by how society is made up, 249
how big minorities are and how they are distributed, the ratio seeks to test in how far, if 250
at all, different minority-majority relationships influence segregation behaviour and 251
tolerance levels. The traditional Schelling model has usually assumed an even split, an 252
assumption that is not theoretically useful in the context of migration and attitudes 253
towards diversity. 254
Considered tiles to move 255
The parameter z specifies the number of vacant locations than each agent considers 256
when moving. At the beginning of each simulation it is initialised randomly by drawing 257
from a discrete uniform distribution z ∼ U(25, 125). The minimum and maximum of 258
this distribution correspond to 1% and 5% respectively of the size of the entire lattice. 259
2.3 Immigration treatments 260
There are five different experimental treatments for immigration of blue agents into the 261
model, which correspond to five different values of the parameter E. These are 262
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summarised in table 5. Immigration waves arrive within the first 1,000 ticks of 263
tmax = 20, 000. This allows agents to adjust their behaviour for a prolonged period after 264
the last migration wave has occurred. 265
The first treatment E = 0 is a control condition with no immigration taking place. 266
In this condition, both natives and migrants are initialised at the start of the simulation 267
and there is no increase in the size of the migrant group over time. The four remaining 268
treatments all feature immigration at different rates, aiming to simulate one-off large 269
influxes of migrants as well as a “trickle-down” scenario in which few migrants arrive at 270
one time, but do so for a sustained period of time. The precise dynamics are described 271
by equations 4 to 7 in the previous section. 272
2.4 Dependent variables 273
For each realisation of the model we sample and record dependent variables every 10 274
time steps, to allow for both cross-sectional and time-series analysis of any effects. 275
These variables are described in turn below, and summarised in table 6. 276
As proposed in [23], we record Moran’s index of spatial autocorrelation in order to 277
quantify the amount of segregation by colour: 278
M ct =
|At|∑
(i,j)∈A2t wi,j
∑
(i,j)∈A2t wi,j(ci − c¯t)(cj − c¯t)∑
i∈At(ci − c¯t)2
(9)
where the mean colour is c¯t =
∑
i∈At ci/|At|, and wi,j = 1 if and only if agents ai and 279
aj are immediately adjacent on the lattice (including diagonals), otherwise wi,j = 0. 280
Crucially we also compute the Moran’s I of tolerance, Mft , by substituting f in place 281
of c in equation 9: 282
Mft =
|At|∑
(i,j)∈A2t wi,j
∑
(i,j)∈A2t wi,j(fi − f¯t)(fj − f¯t)∑
i∈At(fi − f¯t)2
(10)
We also record the first four moments of the tolerance distribution across the 283
population (f¯t, σ
2
ft
, γft and κft), and subdivide this into tolerance of migrants: 284
f¯Bt =
∑
ai∈Bt
fi/|Bt| (11)
and tolerance of natives: 285
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f¯Gt =
∑
ai∈Gt
fi/|Gt| (12)
where Bt is the migrant population {ai ∈ At : ci = B}, and Gt is the native population 286
{ai ∈ At : ci = G}. 287
Finally, to help identify whether the tolerance distribution is bimodal, we record the 288
bimodality coefficient [25] of the tolerance distribution: 289
βft =
γ2ft + 1
κft
(13)
As a notational convention, we refer to the final value of an independent variable at 290
t = tmax by omitting the time subscript from all of the above. 291
Parameter Distribution Description
NatShare ∼ U(0.02, 0.98) Fraction of natives
PopDen ∼ U(0.75, 0.98) Final population density
∆f ∼ U(10−5, 10−3) Rate of change of tolerance
z ∼ U(25, 125) No. of considered locations when moving
Table 1. Independent variables
Parameter Range
NatShare 0.2 ≤ NatShare ≤ 0.8
∆f 5× 10−4 ≤ ∆f < 0.001
Table 2. Restricted ranges of independent variables for which the model converges
within t ≤ tmax
Constant Description
tmig = 1, 000 Time until final migration
tmax = 20, 000 Maximum number of ticks per simulation
N = 50× 50 Size of lattice
fmin = 0.05 Minimum tolerance
fmax = 0.95 Maximum tolerance
Table 3. Constants
Variable Description
At The population of agents
ci,t Colour of agent ai
fi,t Tolerance of agent ai
ui,t Utility of agent ai
pi,t Position of agent ai
Nt(ai) The set of agents that are neighbours of agent ai
H(p) The set of locations in the neighbourhood of location p
Table 4. State variables
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Treatment E = 0 E = 1 E = 4 E = 15 E = 100
Migration No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of waves - 1 4 15 100
Table 5. Treatment conditions
Variable Description
M ct Segregation of colour at time t (equation 9)
Mft Segregation of tolerance at time t (equation 10)
f¯Bt Tolerance of migrants at time t (equation 11)
f¯Gt Tolerance of natives at time t (equation 12)
βf Bimodality of tolerance at the end of the simulation (equation 13)
M c Segregation of colour at the end of the simulation
Mf Segregation of tolerance at the end of the simulation
f¯G Tolerance of natives at the end of the simulation
f¯B Tolerance of migrants at the end of the simulation
Table 6. Dependent variables
3 Results 292
The model was analysed through simulation and empirical methods. For each treatment 293
in table 5 we executed 7,000 independent realisations of the model, drawing free 294
parameters from the distributions specified in table 1. Each realisation was run for a 295
total of tmax = 20, 000 simulation ticks. This resulted in a total of 5× 7, 000 = 35, 000 296
cross-sectional samples of each of the dependent variables (table 6). During each 297
simulation we also sample all dependent-variables every 10 ticks, resulting in a total of 298
35, 000× (20, 000/10) = 7× 107 time-series samples. In the following we first give an 299
overview of the qualitative properties of a single typical simulation run before analysing 300
the aggregate data across simulation runs. The model is updated sequentially, every 301
tick. Agents act in sequential order; that order is shuffled every tick to avoid tactical 302
advantages that might result from a pre-determined sequence. 303
3.1 A typical simulation run 304
Fig 2 shows a visualisation of a typical simulation run to demonstrate the clustering of 305
agents. The top row shows a progression of migration (E = 4) at a starting density of 306
37%, filling up with migrants up until a 75% density so that both groups are equal in 307
size. The blue and green agents move around, empty space is white. 308
The bottom row shows the corresponding tolerance heat-map. Light colours denote 309
tolerant agents, dark colours denote intolerant agents, and the grey areas are vacant 310
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Fig 2. States of the simulation at different times. The top row shows the colours ci of
each agent. The bottom row shows the corresponding tolerance heatmap.
tiles. The period from t = 90 (pre-migration) to t = 100 (post-migration) is marked by 311
a significant changes in tolerance levels. The native fraction of the population that is 312
not in vicinity of migrants are uniformally hostile, whereas the newly arrived migrants 313
have a large variance in their tolerance levels, which are randomly drawn from a 314
uniform distribution upon entering the map. At this stage, the map is sparsely 315
populated and the clusters of migrant and natives have visible buffer-zones between 316
which make inter-group contact less likely. 317
As more migrants arrive, we start to observe the effects of inter-group contact. 318
Natives exposed to migrants react either by increasing their tolerance, resulting in the 319
lighter colours visible at t = 300, or by moving. Once all of the migrants arrive, at 320
t = 790, there are two pronounced clusters of agents (one of which wraps around the 321
grid). On the tolerance heat-map, we see corresponding clusters of tolerance, with 322
highly-intolerant agents surrounded by highly-tolerant agents. At this stage, most of the 323
population has either very high or very low levels of tolerance, but as long as there is 324
enough empty space to form a buffer zones between the clusters, the majority of agents 325
are still highly intolerant, because only very few contact situations arise; unhappy 326
agents relocate before adapting their tolerance levels. 327
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This situation changes as space becomes more scarce. The final two states shown in 328
Fig 2 illustrate a rapid phase-transition from a mainly intolerant society into a bimodal 329
society of two equally-large fractions of highly-tolerant and highly-intolerant agents. 330
The vacant buffer zones are now populated with tolerant agents of both colours who 331
have relocated from the periphery of their respective clusters, thus forming a new zone 332
of highly-tolerant agents. This tolerant zone expands as more out-group members mix 333
in these high-tolerance areas, which in turn influence agents on the periphery of the 334
intolerant clusters through positive contact, which results in a rapid erosion of their size. 335
This process continues until the intolerant clusters are completely surrounded by 336
tolerant agents, who are satisfied and therefore static. This provides a dense, rigid 337
substrate which restricts the movement of agents on the periphery of the intolerant 338
clusters, who provide a protective membrane shielding the inner-core from further 339
out-group contact. The periphery itself is highly dynamic; because agents on the 340
periphery are unhappy they relocate, but their range of movement is restricted to 341
locations within or near the cluster. However, inside these clusters, agents are intolerant 342
but satisfied, as they are surrounded by in-group members, and therefore they remain 343
static. Thus the entire cluster of intolerant agents achieves a relatively stable 344
configuration, and persists over time. 345
The smaller orange-coloured clusters are unstable pockets of medium tolerance 346
which appear throughout the simulation, but rapidly disappear again as they consist 347
entirely of satisfied agents who either become more tolerant through out-group contact, 348
or become isolated and intolerant. 349
Thus movement and adaptive tolerance interact leading to an emergent 350
shield-and-buffer dynamic that polarises the population, causing it to self-assort along 351
the tolerance axis with agents being either extremely tolerant or intolerant. Although in 352
this section we have only discussed a single simulation run, in subsequent sections we 353
show empirically that the model results in bimodal tolerance for many different initial 354
conditions, and despite Monte-Carlo variance. 355
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3.2 Model convergence 356
As discussed in the previous section, the model exhibits subtle dynamics, and therefore 357
it is important to establish whether the key dependent variables stabilise within the 358
finite time period t ≤ tmax. We test the convergence of each independent realisation of 359
the model individually by analysing the final n = 250 values Vf of the time-series of 360
each independent variable V sampled at intervals of 10 ticks. The criteria we use to test 361
convergence of each variable are: i) if the variance of the final sample is extremely small 362
σ2Vf < 10
−20; or (ii) the standard deviation is small compared to the overall range 363
σVf < [max(V )−min(V )]× 10−4; or iii) if Vf is stationary under an augmented 364
Dickey-Fuller test [26]. The latter is established by estimating the model 365
∆Vt = α+ βt+ γVt−1 + δ1∆Vt−1 + . . .+ δλ−1∆Vt−λ+1 + t where the lag order λ is 366
chosen using the Akaike information criterion, and accepting the time-series as 367
convergent iff. if the value of the test statistic γˆ/SE(γˆ) is less than the critical value 368
for p = 0.05. 369
These criteria were chosen because they allow us to test not only for cases where the 370
model reaches a static steady state in which values of dependent variables are constant 371
over time, but also stochastic steady states in which the ensemble time-series is 372
stationary; i.e. the moments, such as the mean and variance, are constant, despite the 373
fact that the dependent variable has non-zero rate of change. 374
Using the above criteria, we analyse the time-series of the tolerance of migrants, the 375
tolerance of natives, and the segregation of colour; i.e. V ∈ {f¯Bt , f¯Gt ,M ct }. We record 376
that the sample path has converged for a given realisation i.i.f. all three variables 377
converge in the final period. 378
Over the entire range of parameters, we were only able to reject the null hypothesis 379
of non-stationarity for 86% of the sample paths. We were able to identify which 380
independent variables contributed to the convergence of the model through a correlation 381
analysis, which identified NatShare and ∆f as the most promising explanatory 382
variables. We binned NatShare and ∆f × 100 into bins of size 0.05, and plotted the 383
proportion of sample paths that converged within each bin (Figure 3). 384
As we expected, the highest failure rate occurs for extreme values of NatShare and 385
for small values of ∆f < 0.0005; for very small values of ∆f agents adapt very slowly, 386
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Fig 3. Proportion of sample paths that test positively for convergence by independent
variable. Each variable X is binned into intervals of size 0.05, and then we count the
fraction of sample paths which pass the test within each bin.
and the model fails to reach equilibrium within t ≤ tmax, whereas for extreme values of 387
NatShare, the respective minorities are likely too small to form sustainable clusters, 388
thus breaking up and forming again. In fact, both variables interact; if we do not 389
control for NatShare then the convergence rate increases asymptotically, but slowly, 390
with ∆f . However, if we control for extreme values of NatShare then provided that 391
∆f ≥ 0.0005 we obtain fairly consistent convergence rates of ∼ 97%. As we show 392
empirically in the next section, for these parameter ranges the ensemble of sample paths 393
is wide-sense stationary; i.e. the mean of the dependent variable across sample paths 394
does not change over time. 395
Based on our convergence analysis, we restricted the ranges of the NatShare and 396
∆f parameters used in the remainder of the paper. All results in subsequent sections use 397
the ranges 0.2 ≤NatShare≤ 0.8, and ∆f ≥ 0.0005, for which the vast majority (97%) of 398
sample paths test positively for convergence. These ranges are summarised in Table 2. 399
3.3 Time-series analysis 400
The tolerance of natives f¯G (henceforth: ‘native tolerance’) and migrants f¯B 401
(henceforth: ‘migrant tolerance’) over time is plotted in Fig 4). An important variable 402
affecting tolerance behaviour is NatShare, which determines the final size of the native 403
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share of the population. Fig 4 shows tolerance levels over time by the high and low 404
values of native share, grouped into NatShare ≤ 0.3 and NatShare ≤ 0.7 respectively. 405
In the case of low native share, under no migration (E = 0) conditions, natives and 406
migrants behave similarly (graphs Fig 4a and Fig 4f). The majority group is slightly 407
less tolerant. The differences are visible at first, but nearly converge after t = 2500. The 408
differences are very small, but still significant. 409
The case of E = 1 stands out from the rest. When NatShare is low (Fig 4b), 410
natives never recover fully from the initial shock of migration. As with all other cases, 411
native tolerance drops sharply and quickly recovers, but not exceeding f¯G = 0.7 for the 412
remaining time. The reverse scenario of high NatShare (Fig 4g) is visibly different: 413
natives recover and reach near-total tolerance, along with migrants. These values are 414
slightly higher than those observed in Fig4 f, with no migration. The reason that the 415
E = 1 treatment is so different from the rest is that in the case of low NatShare, the 416
proportion of natives to migrants is flipped immediately: native agents who constitute 417
20% of the final population make up 100% of the pre-migration population. Because of 418
the large number of migrants coming in, many migrants are immediately exposed to a 419
majority of migrants, presenting a shock not just to parts of the population, but to 420
most of it. As no migrants had been present before, natives have not clustered into 421
groups which could at least ‘shield’ the inner part from the effects of the one-off 422
migration (this is because segregation behaviour is triggered by unhappiness rather than 423
absence of out-group members, see section 2.1). Because natives suddenly find 424
themselves in a minority and most of the agents become unhappy, they will move into 425
areas with fewer migrants. The sudden influx has prevented even moderate natives to 426
adapt to their changing neighbourhood, and as they start to segregate away, not enough 427
tolerant natives remain to become happy and increase their tolerance levels. The 428
sudden minority is an important element of this behaviour. As the high NatShare 429
situation shows (Fig 4g), a one-off influx does not reduce long-term native tolerance 430
when natives are in a majority even after the large migration wave. In contrast, natives 431
in E = 0 treatments are exposed to migrants from the very beginning: they experience 432
unhappiness and will segregate to improve it, creating pockets of happy and intolerant 433
natives surrounded by tolerant natives that are exposed to migrants and shield the 434
intolerant parts of their population group from exposure. This process is not achieved in 435
PLOS 20/36
0 2500 5000 7500 10000 12500 15000 17500 20000
(a)
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
E=
0
to
le
ra
nc
e 
le
ve
l
0.2 NativeShare 0.3
Native tolerance fG
Migrant tolerance fB
0 2500 5000 7500 10000 12500 15000 17500 20000
(f)
0.7 NativeShare 0.8
Native tolerance fG
Migrant tolerance fB
0 2500 5000 7500 10000 12500 15000 17500 20000
(b)
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
E=
1
to
le
ra
nc
e 
le
ve
l
Native tolerance fG
Migrant tolerance fB
0 2500 5000 7500 10000 12500 15000 17500 20000
(g)
Native tolerance fG
Migrant tolerance fB
0 2500 5000 7500 10000 12500 15000 17500 20000
(c)
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
E=
4
to
le
ra
nc
e 
le
ve
l
Native tolerance fG
Migrant tolerance fB
0 2500 5000 7500 10000 12500 15000 17500 20000
(h)
Native tolerance fG
Migrant tolerance fB
0 2500 5000 7500 10000 12500 15000 17500 20000
(d)
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
E=
15
to
le
ra
nc
e 
le
ve
l
Native tolerance fG
Migrant tolerance fB
0 2500 5000 7500 10000 12500 15000 17500 20000
(i)
Native tolerance fG
Migrant tolerance fB
0 2500 5000 7500 10000 12500 15000 17500 20000
(e)
time
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
E=
10
0
to
le
ra
nc
e 
le
ve
l
Native tolerance fG
Migrant tolerance fB
0 2500 5000 7500 10000 12500 15000 17500 20000
(j)
time
Native tolerance fG
Migrant tolerance fB
Native and migrant tolerance across experiments by low and high native share (time series)
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E = 1 treatments, where previous absence of migrants has meant that native tolerance 436
had started to decline. 437
At E = 4 (Fig 4c, Fig 4h), the shocks from each migration wave is visible. When 438
NatShare is low (Fig 4c), migrant tolerance is low when migration is still occurring. 439
The increases in tolerance at each migration wave is due to the random initialisation of 440
tolerance for new migrants. Effectively, each wave presents an opportunity to tip the 441
tolerance balance within the population. This is not achieved until the fourth and last 442
wave of migration has arrived at t = 700. Natives are visibly affected by the influx of 443
migrants. During the first two migration waves, native tolerance f¯G drops to near-zero, 444
before increasing sharply to above 0.6 at t = 1000. Beyond this point, both natives and 445
migrants transition to a majority tolerant society of f¯G > 0.98 by t = 5000. 446
For E = 15 (Fig 4d,i) and E = 100 (Fig 4e,j) the overall pattern is very similar. The 447
migration waves are no longer as visible on the graphs, as the size of waves is not large 448
enough to upset the overall population. Both natives and migrants will first experience 449
a drop to low levels of tolerance, and recover quickly as more waves arrive, reaching 450
their peak. Higher numbers of migration waves increase the time required to reach 451
convergence of peak tolerance when NatShare is high (Fig 4i,j). When E = 4, the peak 452
is reached by t = 5000. When E = 100, this requires an additional 2,500 ticks. This 453
means that for longer periods of time, the population groups are not as tolerant. The 454
higher convergence times are also visible in Fig 3. 455
A notable difference between natives and migrants in the E = 15 and E = 100 cases 456
is that natives will always drop their tolerance to near-zero, regardless of their 457
population share. Migrants mirror this pattern only when they are in the minority (Fig 458
4d,e). When migrants are a majority (Fig4 i,j) their lowest tolerance is above 0.1. If 459
natives and migrants behaved the same way, the graphs on the left should be mirrored 460
by the graphs on the right. 461
Lastly, when E = 100 and NatShare is high (Fig 4j), the maximum tolerance levels 462
are not as high compared to cases with fewer migration waves. The variance increases 463
as the number of waves increases, suggesting a less settled pattern of tolerance. 464
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3.4 Cross-sectional analysis 465
In this section we analyse the dependent variables listed in table 6 across a total of 466
15,000 independent simulation runs, drawing parameters from the distributions in 467
table 1. 468
Fig 5 shows a scatter-plot of the average final tolerance of each group against the 469
native-share initial condition (NatShare), subdivided by treatment. The first column 470
shows the tolerance of natives f¯G and the second column depicts the tolerance of 471
migrants f¯B . Outcomes from the five immigration treatments from table 5 are each 472
shown on a separate row. 473
Because both natives and migrants share the same decision-rule for adapting their 474
tolerance (algorithm 2), our initial intuition was that all the graphs would simply be 475
mirrored. The control treatment with no migration, E = 0, shows this mirroring 476
pattern for both native and migrant agents: when natives are in a minority, their 477
tolerance is more varied, dropping to 0.8. The same behaviour is observed for migrants 478
when they are in the minority. 479
When migration occurs only once (E = 1), natives and migrants differ markedly in 480
their tolerance behaviour. Part of the pattern is still mirrored: natives that constitute 481
the vast majority of agents (NatShare ≥ 0.7) are very tolerant, as are migrants when 482
NatShare ≤ 0.3. When natives are in majorities smaller than 0.7, the native tolerance 483
splits: a large number of cases see very high native tolerance, and very low tolerance. 484
Medium levels of f¯G are observed throughout. A part of this pattern is reflected in the 485
earlier time-series of native tolerance in Fig 4. Migrants don’t diverge in their behaviour 486
as much, although their tolerance starts to vary more as well, never dropping below 0.6. 487
Migrants in minorities cope better than natives in minorities when E = 1. 488
This pattern does not apply for the cases E > 1. When E = 4, both natives and 489
migrants are very tolerant with the exception of one outlier each, where tolerance is at 490
or near zero. When E = 15, more cases of intolerant natives and migrants occur 491
throughout the range of NatShare. When E = 100, those low-tolerance cases only 492
appear at NatShare ≥ 0.5. Thus, when the number of migration waves is very high 493
and natives form the majority of the population, more cases of intolerance occur. 494
Tolerance levels always verge on the extreme ends of the scale. 495
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Fig 5. Scatter plots, by treatment, of native tolerance (f¯G) and migrant tolerance (f¯B) against native share of the
population (NatShare), in steady-state at t = tmax.
The different types of migration flows modelled by the treatments in table 5 do not 496
significantly affect the broad functional relationship between tolerance (f¯) and 497
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native-share (NatShare) if E > 1. The high variance of native tolerance at E = 1 is 498
likely due to the fact that the one-off migration wave is so disruptive that for large 499
parameter ranges, natives do not recover their tolerance. 500
High tolerance within very small groups is likely due to the fact that with so few 501
agents, no coherent group can form, and thus all free-moving agents become more and 502
more tolerant as they have no homogeneous neighbourhood to escape into. This line of 503
reasoning is intuitive for migrants in general, since they arrive in smaller batches. The 504
high variance of tolerant minority migrants could be down to their initial placement. 505
Depending on where their clusters are located, they may find a cluster large enough to 506
ensure lower tolerance levels. Those that roam the map on their own will exhibit high 507
tolerance levels. 508
As ∆f affects how quickly agents change their tolerance, we investigate its effects on 509
agent tolerance as well. Figure 6 presents the same variables as Figure 5, this time with 510
∆f as the independent variable instead of NatShare. The overall patterns are very 511
similar: migrant and native tolerance are very high in cases of E = 0, 4, 15 and 100, 512
with an increasing number of low-tolerance agents as the number of migration waves 513
increases. Again, E = 1 is a clear outlier. We recall that NatShare values up to 0.6 514
correlate with a high variance of native tolerance. The majority of agents are either 515
extremely tolerant or intolerant, but in contrast to the other cases of E, many moderate 516
natives exist, too. At NatShare levels above 0.7, tolerance once again dominates. ∆f 517
as an independent variable affects f¯G differently: as ∆f increases, native tolerance 518
decreases. In other words, when natives can change their tolerance more quickly, many 519
of them become more intolerant. However, just like NatShare, a proportion of natives 520
stay very tolerance throughout all values of ∆f . As ∆f increases past 0.6, the variance 521
of tolerance levels increases. More agents assume moderate tolerance levels- however, 522
the majority reside on either side of the extreme. As discussed above, E = 1 deviates 523
from the rest of the findings, and only does so for native agents. Figure 6 shows that 524
∆f is very important in determining the overall tolerance levels of natives in the case of 525
E = 1: when agents are very slow to change their minds (∆f ≤ 0.2), they change too 526
slowly in order to express the experience of the large migration wave as low tolerance. 527
When natives can react quicker (that is, they need fewer rounds to reach a new level of 528
required in-group neighbours), they start to decrease their tolerance levels. It should be 529
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Fig 6. Scatter plots, by treatment, of native tolerance (f¯G) and migrant tolerance (f¯B) against the rate of change of
tolerance (∆f), in steady-state at t = tmax.
noted that until ∆f of 0.5, overall tolerant natives are still in the majority and that no 530
natives below a f¯G = 0.5 exist. For the other cases of E however, ∆f does not show 531
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such an impact. 532
3.5 Bimodality analysis 533
Both the cross-sectional and the time-series analysis indicate highly polarised tolerance 534
levels. Fig 7 shows a histogram of tolerance values fi across the population at the end 535
of representative simulation runs. In these cases, tolerance values are concentrated at 536
both extremes of the distribution, and the distribution is bimodal. Depending on the 537
parameters, the split can vary between 30-70 and 70-30, with less than 10% of agents 538
taking more moderate tolerance values. Thus parameters can determine the extent to 539
which a population leans to the very tolerant or very intolerant, but the overall pattern 540
remains that of a deeply divided society. 541
Fig 7. Histograms of the three most common distributions of final tolerance levels fi.
Intermediate tolerance is infrequent when tolerance levels are polarised.
Fig 8 shows a scatterplot of the bimodality coefficient of tolerance Bf against the 542
native share of the population across all simulation runs. Regardless of the experimental 543
setup, the bimodality coefficient is almost always above the critical value Bf >
5
9 , 544
denoted by the red horizontal line. Due to their similarity, E = 1 and E = 4, as well as 545
E = 15 and E = 100 were grouped together. Bimodality is lowest when native share is 546
either < 13 or >
2
3 of the population. In cases with migration, bimodality drops earlier 547
compared to the control. In a large number of cases, bimodality is nearly at 1 for the 548
mid-range values of native share, illustrating its strong polarising effect on the 549
population. The sharp drops in bimodality near the critical value are caused mainly by 550
very low values of ∆f . 551
A divided society of agents is typical for a Schelling model, since agents are 552
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Fig 8. Scatterplot of the bimodality coefficient of the tolerance distribution βf at the
end of simulations, against native share of the population (NatShare). Treatments
were merged here due to their similarity. The critical value βf >
5
9 is denoted by the
horizontal red line.
intrinsically homophilic by construction. However, divisions in a Schelling model are 553
based on colour, or in this case, native or migrant status. The segregation of tolerance 554
in this case is higher: Fig 9 shows the Moran’s I of spatial autocorrelation for both 555
colour-based segregation M c (as typically measured in a Schelling model) and for 556
tolerance-based segregation Mf . Again, the results are grouped into both ends of native 557
share values and broken down by immigration treatment. The long-term segregation 558
levels for out-groups (colour) are consistent throughout all cases, including the control 559
(Fig 9a,f), never reaching M c = 0.2. The values are not much higher than the values 560
observed when movement is random (i.e. 0.1 ≤M c ≤ 0.15). Schelling models have a 561
baseline M c value because some segregation exists by pure chance of agents’ position at 562
any point in time, suggesting that adaptive agents can circumvent segregation of colour 563
to a large extent. 564
By contrast, segregation of tolerance attitudes, Mf is higher at the end of each 565
simulation for most treatments of E and levels of NatShare. The exception is E = 1 566
and low NatShare, Fig 9b which sees both colour and tolerance segregation at similar 567
low levels. 568
The differences between M c and M c are more pronounced when NatShare is high 569
(Fig 9h-j). In the case of E = 4 (Fig 9h), each migration wave is a visible shock to the 570
existing tolerance level. Each drives Mf and M c up. The same pattern is true of E > 4 571
(Fig 9i,j), but the smaller waves leave less distinct marks. As seen previously with 572
tolerance developments in Fig 4, the values change most during the arrival of migration 573
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Fig 9. Time series, by treatment, of the segregation levels of colour M ct (black), and tolerance M
f
t (yellow), filtered by
extreme values of the native-share initial condition (0.3 ≤ NatShare ≥ 0.7). The error bars show the 95% confidence
intervals of the mean of Mt across simulation runs. The dashed line at tmig marks the end of migration waves.
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waves, and settle once the final wave has arrived. Convergence of segregation values is 574
reached before t = 5000, where cases of E > 1 and high NatShare (Fig 9h-j) need 575
slightly longer than cases with low NatShare (Fig 8c-e). Long-term levels of tolerance 576
segregation are at or above 0.2 when E > 1, whereas no migration shows lower levels of 577
Mf . 578
The higher level of attitude-based segregation is interesting because agents do not 579
actively seek out tolerant or intolerant neighbours; in fact, they are oblivious to the 580
tolerance attitudes of their neighbours. The movement rule, as described in 1 and 2, 581
drives adjustment of attitudes, but not an open choice of out-group neighbourhood, as 582
is the case with agent colour. The connection between diverse neighbourhoods and 583
adjustments of tolerance seems to cause an unintended, much larger segregation than 584
that of out-groups. Previous work including segregation of preferences have found the 585
same effect (see [27] and [19]), but the scale of Mf is much lower in this adaptive model 586
(see [19] for more insight into Mf in a non-adaptive model). 587
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Fig 10. Scatterplot of the bimodality coefficient of the tolerance distribution βf at the
end of simulations, against the rate of change of tolerance (∆f ). Again, treatments were
merged due to their similarity. The critical value βf >
5
9 is denoted by the horizontal
red line.
Figure 10 shows the bimodality coefficient of tolerance just like Figure 8, this time 588
against ∆f , the rate of change of tolerance. As in the case of NatShare, the vast 589
majority of cases reside above the critical value of βf >
5
9 , with only a handful of cases 590
below the red line. The strong bimodality of tolerance throughout all cases of E is also 591
upheld for the range of ∆f , showing that even at very low levels of ∆f , bimodality is 592
still hight. Overall, lower values of ∆f lead to lower levels of bimodality (yet above the 593
critical value). That agents who can change their tolerance more quickly tend towards 594
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higher bimodality levels is intuitive: the ability to change tolerance quickly can push 595
agents towards the extreme ends more easily. However, we recall as shown in Figure ??, 596
∆f alone does not determine the split between high and low tolerance agents. 597
4 Discussion 598
Our modelling work contributes insights both to sociology and political science, which 599
we discuss in turn below. 600
From the perspective of sociology, our results highlight the importance of minority 601
and majority situations, which is corroborated by other studies [20]. Migration matters, 602
but minority-majority population shares mediates the effects strongly, especially in the 603
short-term. The differences are particularly pronounced for extreme values of the 604
population share, and the effects can be both negative as well as positive. The 605
importance of population share is in line with [8]’s suggestion that the respective 606
standings of each out-group in society plays an important role in contact situations. 607
Our model suggests that the mere size difference leads to logistic situations that affect 608
inter-group contact. This result also resonates with some of the findings in the empirical 609
literature. For example, [28] find that majority groups experience a greater decline in 610
prejudice as the result of contact compared to minority groups. The status of groups 611
influences the potential perceived threat [6]. Dominant groups might fear a loss of 612
privilege, the subordinate groups might worry about oppression [6, p.195]. 613
From the perspective of political science, we have shown that simple yet 614
theoretically-plausible behavioural rules can give rise to a polarisation in tolerance 615
towards out-groups, and self-assortment of the population into tolerant and intolerant 616
clusters. Neither behaviour is built into the model from the outset, but rather these are 617
emergent behaviours that arise from a subtle interaction between adaptive tolerance and 618
movement of the population. Crucially, divisions of native-migrant groups do not 619
necessarily predict divisions in tolerance. Rather, intermediate tolerance levels are 620
inherently unstable when movement and tolerance-adaptation interact. Sometimes 621
individual agents transition from one extreme to the other, but most agents remain 622
either very tolerant or intolerant. 623
This assortment of the population into communities of similar tolerance is highly 624
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reminiscent of the current political landscape in the UK, the US and the many 625
European countries that have experienced a surge in populist parties. These new 626
developments have shifted the divide between economic left and right to more 627
sociocultural divisions. In Britain, those who voted to leave the EU in the 2016 628
referendum were characterised by social conservatism, nationalism and low levels of 629
political trust, whereas remain voters were more likely social liberals, cosmopolitan and 630
high on trust values [29]. Similar divisions are visible for Trump and Clinton voters in 631
the US. Social and economic ideologies change how voters perceive social and economic 632
issues [30]. Non-economic issues have become increasingly important for political parties 633
in the West [31], and populist parties and candidates appeal on the basis of fears about 634
immigration, sovereignty, and security. Both liberals and conservatives are subject to 635
increased prejudice towards the respective political out-group [30], but the rise in 636
populist narrative builds on immigrant narratives especially in the Netherlands and in 637
the Brexit referendum in Britain [29]. The Leave majority was highest in areas that 638
were the least diverse or featured high numbers of working-class voters; but also in areas 639
which had experienced rapid demographic change as the result of immigration in the 640
past ten years [29]. 641
Moreover, the mechanism that causes self-assortment along the tolerance axis also 642
has a plausible real-world analogue. Within the model, polarisation of tolerance is 643
caused by the shield-and-buffer dynamic described in section 3.1 which prevents clusters 644
of intolerant agents from one group from being exposed to out-group agents. This 645
shield-and-buffer dynamic might offer one potential explanation for the political 646
bimodality found today. Cosmopolitan areas of a country are generally populated by 647
people that are more tolerant of migrants; and migrants that reside in these areas are 648
generally tolerant in turn [5]. However, if the migrant diaspora exceeds a certain size, it 649
could potentially sustain a sub-culture that is not dependent on integration with the 650
host population. If non-migrants that live outside these areas have no direct contact 651
with migrants, or the migrant fraction of the population is too small to provide 652
sufficient contact situations, and peoples’ out-group tolerance increases or decreases as 653
described by contact and threat-theory, then polarisation would ensue, just as it does in 654
our model. 655
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